Wednesday, 11 November 2009

Economics focus: The lessons of 1937 | The Economist

The lessons of 1937 Jun 18th 2009
From The Economist

In a guest article, Christina Romer says policymakers must learn from the errors that prolonged the Depression

Christina Romer is the chairwoman of Barack Obama's Council of Economic Advisers and a scholar of the Depression

At a recent congressional hearing I cautiously noted some “glimmers of hope” that the economy could stabilise and perhaps start to rebound later in the year. I was asked if this meant that we should cancel much of the remaining spending in the $787 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. I responded that the expected recovery was both months away and predicated on Recovery Act spending ramping up greatly.

Only later did it hit me that I should have told the story of 1937. The recovery from the Depression is often described as slow because America did not return to full employment until after the outbreak of the second world war. But the truth is the recovery in the four years after Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1933 was incredibly rapid. Annual real GDP growth averaged over 9%. Unemployment fell from 25% to 14%.

The second world war aside, the United States has never experienced such sustained, rapid growth. However, that growth was halted by a second severe downturn in 1937-38, when unemployment surged again to 19%. The fundamental cause of this second recession was an unfortunate, and largely inadvertent, switch to contractionary fiscal and monetary policy. One source of the growth in 1936 was that Congress had overridden Mr Roosevelt’s veto and passed a large bonus for veterans of the first world war.

In 1937, this fiscal stimulus disappeared. In addition, social-security taxes were collected for the first time. These factors reduced the deficit by roughly 2.5% of GDP, exerting significant contractionary pressure. Also important was an accidental switch to contractionary monetary policy.

In 1936 the Federal Reserve began to worry about its “exit strategy”. After several years of relatively loose monetary policy, American banks were holding large quantities of reserves in excess of their legislated requirements. Monetary policymakers feared these excess reserves would make it difficult to tighten if inflation developed or if “speculative excess” began again on Wall Street.

In July 1936 the Fed’s board of governors stated that existing excess reserves could “create an injurious credit expansion” and that it had “decided to lock up” those excess reserves “as a measure of prevention”. The Fed then doubled reserve requirements in a series of steps. Unfortunately it turned out that banks, still nervous after the financial panics of the early 1930s, wanted to hold excess reserves as a cushion.

When that excess was legislated away, they scrambled to replace it by reducing lending. According to a classic study of the Depression by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, the resulting monetary contraction was a central cause of the 1937-38 recession. The 1937 episode provides a cautionary tale.

The urge to declare victory and get back to normal policy after an economic crisis is strong. That urge needs to be resisted until the economy is again approaching full employment. Financial crises, in particular, tend to leave scars that make financial institutions, households and firms behave differently. If the government withdraws support too early, a return to economic decline or even panic could follow.

In this regard, not only should we not prematurely stop Recovery Act spending, we need to plan carefully for its expiration. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the Recovery Act will provide nearly $400 billion of stimulus in the 2010 fiscal year, but just over $130 billion in 2011. This implies a fiscal contraction of about 2% of GDP. If all goes well, private demand will have increased enough by then to fill the gap. If that is not the case, broad policy support may need to be sustained somewhat longer.

Perhaps a more fundamental lesson is that policymakers should find constructive ways to respond to the natural pressure to cut back on stimulus. For example, the Federal Reserve’s balance-sheet has more than doubled during the crisis, drawing considerable attention.

Monetary policymakers have made it clear that they believe continued monetary ease is appropriate. Moreover, the Fed’s credit programmes are to some degree self-eliminating: as demand for its special credit facilities shrinks, so will its balance-sheet. But now may also be a sensible time to grant the Fed additional tools to help its balance-sheet contract once the economy has recovered.

Some have suggested that the Fed be authorised to issue debt, as many other central banks do. This would enhance its ability to withdraw excess cash from the financial system. Granting such additional tools now could provide confidence that the Fed will be able to respond to inflationary pressures, without it having to create that confidence by actually tightening prematurely. Fiscal health check Now is also the time to think about our long-run fiscal situation.

Despite the large budget deficit President Obama inherited, dealing with the current crisis required increasing the deficit substantially. To switch to austerity in the immediate future would surely set back recovery and risk a 1937-like recession-within-a-recession. But many are legitimately concerned about the longer-term budget situation. That is why the president has laid out a plan to shrink the deficit he inherited by half and has repeatedly emphasised the need to reduce the long-term deficit and put the debt-to-GDP ratio on a declining trajectory.

In this regard, health-care reform presents a golden opportunity. The fundamental source of long-run deficits is rising health-care expenditures. By coupling the expansion of coverage with reforms that significantly slow the growth of health-care costs, we can dramatically improve the long-run fiscal situation without tightening prematurely. As someone who has written somewhat critically of the short-sightedness of policymakers in the late 1930s, I feel new humility.

I can see that the pressures they were under were probably enormous. Policymakers today need to learn from their experiences and respond to the same pressures constructively, without derailing the recovery before it has even begun.

This is an excellent article, still relevant as to why US interest rates are not going up anytime soon. KT

Monday, 9 November 2009

No Change

Have not altered positions at all at this stage.
Still happy with all positions.

Saturday, 24 October 2009

Position Update - Finally!

Here are the trades I am active in:

AUD/JPY
Long AUD 3,735,990.04 short JPY at 82.79 average.

Current rate: 84.88
Current: Finally!! A Gain by 209 points.

Comment:
By buying AUD I have converted this trade from a crappy USD/JPY deal to a AUD/JPY deal. See post here. Target is 85.00 enroute to 105.00.

I remain comfortable with carry trades.

Extra background:
Sold USD3m and bought AUD at 0.8030, thus making the USD/JPY trade long AUD3,735,990.04 short JPY at 82.79.

NZD/JPY
Long NZD 3m short JPY at average of 57.23.

Current rate: 69.42
Current: Gain 1,219 points.

Comment:
I remain comfortable with carry trades with the NZD/JPY up over 56.5% this year!
Happy with the current exposure.

EUR/USD
Square

Current rate: 1.5000

Comment:
Overall I see the USD weakening considerably due to quantitative easing pressures. Recent data, especially in housing and unemployment indicates there is no pressure to change monetary policy, and easy conditions in the US will be the norm for a considerable time yet to come.

Cashed out: Way too soon!
Long EUR1m (1.4465) short USD at 1.4550, for a gain of USD8,500.00, NZD12,142.86 (not counting carry interest).

AUD/USD
Long AUD2m short USD at 0.8670.

Current rate: 0.9222
Current: Gain 552 points.

Comment:
I took profits (see below) at 0.8610, but then reinstated again, as it is clear that the AUD/USD has a long way to go yet. Target is now 1.0000.

Cashed out:
Long AUD2m (0.7312) short USD at 0.8610, for a gain of AUD301,509.87, NZD369,950.76 (not counting carry interest).

NZD/USD
Long NZD2m short USD at .7160.

Current rate: 0.7542
Current : Gain 382 points.

Comment:
I took profits (see below) at 0.7010, but then reinstated again, as it is clear that the NZD/USD has a long way to go yet. Target is now the highs of 0.8216.

Cashed out:
Long NZD2m (0.6241) short USD at 0.7010, for a gain of NZD219,400.86 (not counting carry interest).

Unrealised gains NZD886k (AUD/JPY +112k, NZD/JPY +527k, AUD/USD +146k, NZD/USD +101K).

Previous realised balance: NZD1,742,865.90

Plus EUR/USD realised gains of NZD12,142.86
Plus AUD/USD realised gains of NZD369,950.76
Plus NZD/USD realised gains of NZD219,400.86

Total gains banked since August 2007:

NZD2,344,360.38

English relaxed over high dollar

Published today in the press:

New Zealand's high dollar is a vote of confidence in the country's economy, and there is no silver bullet to bring it down for exporters, Finance Minister Bill English says.

The kiwi dollar was trading against the US yesterday at around 76c.

"The dollar is one way the market is telling us Australia and New Zealand have performing economies, because relatively speaking we are," Mr English told Canterbury business leaders yesterday.

Taking a five-year average, the New Zealand dollar was the highest it had been since the 1960s so concerns about the dollar did have some historical basis, Mr English said. "What can we do about this? In many respects not much. We've just got to make sure we've got the story clear."

Mr English said the dollar was high compared with the US and the British pound, but was not high relative to the Australian dollar and Australia was still New Zealand's biggest export market.

"One of the reasons that we are high against the UK and the US is because frankly they are in a bit of a mess."

New Zealand's economy had not shrunk by as much as Britain, US and Europe.
Another driver of the high dollar was low interest rates in other countries, Mr English said.

Interest rates in the US, Japan and the UK were either zero or low, so when investors were offered a triple A-rated New Zealand Government bond at 5.5 percent interest, it was attractive to them compared with the alternative.

New Zealand was now attracting interest from people who were wanting to diversify away from US dollars to buy New Zealand debt or the New Zealand dollar, he said.

Those things were out of the Government's control. "If there was a silver bullet to do with the dollar then we would fire it, but there is not one." The high New Zealand dollar was one of the reasons the export sector had shrunk in the last decade, he said.

New Zealand's economy had an imbalance between the tradeable and non-tradeable sectors. In the last five years the tradeable sector had shrunk by 10 percent and the non-tradeable sector had grown by 15 percent. The biggest driver of that growth was government spending. Growth in the future would not come from a fast-growing government or fast-growing credit, it had to come from the tradeable sector.

"It's (the tradeable sector) up on blocks and someone has taken the wheels."

Mr English also said countries all around the world were going to increase taxes but one country that would not was Australia, which was competing directly for New Zealand's companies and its people.

"We can not afford to raise taxes if they do not," he said.

Excellent article!

I will post later on today as to why, but we need more of this thinking!!

Thursday, 15 October 2009

Apologies for lack of updates!

But it's been bloody busy!!

Tuesday, 29 September 2009

Why Europe Recovers Before the US

Here is a great article on why I like the Euro:

Jerry Bowyer CNBC 24 Sep 2009

“I will not let anyone tell me that we must spend more money." - German Chancellor Angela Merkel, March 29th, 2009

America works even when it's tried in Western Europe, and the old world fails even when it's tried in North America.

This past spring, United Kingdom Prime Minister Gordon Brown and United States President Barack Obama attempted to launch a "global new deal." They attempted to persuade other developed countries, especially in the European Union, to embark on a coordinated program of very high stimulus spending.

Angela Merkel led the opposition, issuing a resounding 'nein'. French President Nicholas Sarkozy added his 'non' to the chorus shortly thereafter. The rest is history. The Obama administration enacted a stupendously large spending program; the United Kingdom followed suit. The European Union resisted the clarion call of international Keynesianism and left the recovery largely to the private sector.

And then, something fascinating happened: They recovered, and we did not. Some of these numbers are a little close to the line and clearly other factors were involved too: The US has had the largest stimulus so far, Britain after that, Germany slightly less than Britain and France much less.

So far,the GDP data shown below indicates that the second quarter (that is, roughly the spring season) growth numbers showed expansion in the two countries that most conspicuously failed to used Keynesian tools. The data also shows that the two countries which most stubbornly hewed to the Keynesian line continued to contract.

Famed French economist Guy Sorman recently told me, "We invented the word 'entrepreneur', exported it to you, and then forgot it. Now, you are sending it back to us."

He's right. At precisely the moment when the United States is shifting toward discarded European solutions such as nationalization, inflation, and fiscal manipulation, a number of European countries are liberalizing their markets.

Angela Merkel has been described by many observers as the German version of Margaret Thatcher. The entrepreneurial Sarkozy ran on a platform of creating a France that "wakes up early."

Not all of this is a matter of electoral shift. The European Union has some structural factors which have helped it resist bad policies. For example, the Union itself imposes certain spending and debt limits on member countries. These limits emboldened European politicians who resisted Anglo-American policy bullying.

Furthermore, the European experience with hyperinflation earlier in the twentieth century persuaded them to focus their central bank exclusively on matters of price stability. The United States, on the other hand, has given our own central bank a "dual mandate" for inflation control to be balanced by low unemployment. In other words, the fiscal phrenology of the Philips curve was hard-wired into the very structure of the Fed.

It's not over yet; there are promising signs that perhaps last year's electoral swing to the left was a summer/fall fling rather than a serious relationship. Time will tell.

But for now, we see played out across the Atlantic a dictum uttered by Someone who was neither a European nor an American: The last shall be first, and the first shall be last.


And it has resulted in debt that the children of the children being born today will be paying off.

It also means the USD must weaken against the Euro in the long term.

It is now just a matter of time - KT.

AUD and NZD trades

I re-established my long NZD and AUD trades yesterday.

Bought AUD2m sold USD at 0.8670.
Bought NZD2m sold USD at 0.7160.

Target 0.9000 and 0.7500.

Review at .8000 and 0.6800